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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

19 May 1982

NOTE FOR: See Distribution

FROM :
Acting NIO/USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

1. Attached is the assessment prepared following the monthly Community warning meeting held on 18 May 1982. Comments would be most welcome.

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Tuesday, 22 June, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. I solicit suggestions regarding any topics or contingencies you feel we may be overlooking, and request that such recommendations be forwarded to me by COB Tuesday, 8 June.

Attachment:
DDI #4160-82

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #4160-82
19 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 18 May 1982) [REDACTED] 25X1

1. Soviet Military Reactions to Falklands Crisis. To date, the Soviets have confined their military activities to fairly routine reconnaissance missions. They have [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] an AGI positioned off Ascension Island, and so far in May have flown three Bear D missions to the Ascension area. In all cases, they have been careful not to violate the British exclusion zones. There is no evidence of any active Soviet program to pass intelligence to the Argentinians. All in all, Soviet military activity so far fits into their general policy approach of criticizing the US and UK, courting the Argentinians, but not becoming directly involved.

2. The Polish Situation. The recent demonstrations have shattered the surface calm but not broken the political stalemate. Jaruzelski remains in control of the decision making structures and of the country but is unwilling or unable to initiate the necessary economic reforms and political dialogue. Soviet comments about Poland have been sparse and uninformative. The PAP dispatches immediately following Rusakov's recent visit concentrated on seemingly peripheral subjects such as party-to-party relations and foreign policy. Although the demonstrations may have destroyed some illusions about popular feelings, there are no signs yet that the regime is getting ready to do anything beyond continuing to live with the stalemate--an immobilism which may be due to actual or perceived inhibitions weighing on Jaruzelski but may also correspond to his inclination to think in long-range, historical terms.

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3. Sino-Soviet Relations. The recent situation has been characterized, on the one hand, by increased civility and on the other hand by increased diplomatic competition--with the PRC having the better of it. The only palpable effect of the Soviets' conciliatory public statements so far has been to improve the atmosphere. It is possible that the Soviets have made more discreet private probes about what concrete steps could be taken to improve relations. There are no signs that the Soviets are getting ready to make real overtures in the areas which the Chinese have stressed as the most important: the military buildup on the border and in Mongolia, and Soviet policy in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. While the recent Soviet statements may make it easier for a post-Brezhnev leadership to take a conciliatory approach, there is little probability of a true Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

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